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No. 3183/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
28 December 1965

## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Cambodia and the Viet CongSummary

The problem of Cambodia's relationship with the Viet Cong centers on two broad but related aspects. One is Sihanouk's foreign policy and how it has been influenced by the growth of the Communist movement in South Vietnam. The other is the use by the Viet Cong of Cambodian territory as a source of supply, sanctuary, and political comfort.

A thorough review of intelligence from all sources confirms that the Viet Cong have procured supplies in and through Cambodia but shows that the volume of such supplies has been small in comparison with Viet Cong requirements and in comparison with what they have received through Laos, by direct sea infiltration, and from within South Vietnam. It is clear that with the complicity of local Cambodian officials the Viet Cong have found safe haven in many areas along the Cambodian border. The Communists have also established small but useful clandestine facilities on Cambodian territory. From all indications these facilities have played only a small part in the over-all Communist effort in South Vietnam.

A substantial body of evidence indicates, however, that the Cambodian Government is not a willing or unwilling accomplice in Viet Cong operations in Cambodia.

Sihanouk is increasingly concerned over charges that Cambodia is being used by the Viet Cong.

although Phnom Penh has tried to take measures to curb such use, its ability to police the 600-mile border with South Vietnam is extremely limited.

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**SECRET**The Political Context


1. The settlement reached in Geneva in 1954 could scarcely have been a better one from Phnom Penh's perspective. Cambodia's newly won independence was legitimized by the international community. The nation's territorial integrity, a matter of utmost concern in Phnom Penh, was guaranteed by the signatories. If such guarantees were more apparent than real, they were better than nothing. The settlement also stopped the fighting just when the war was expanding to Cambodian territory. With a stubbornness and hardness unbecoming a weak and otherwise ineffectual nation, the Cambodian delegation demanded and won the complete withdrawal of Viet Minh troops from Cambodian territory. The Sihanouk government was determined not to begin its tenure with two strikes against it.

2. Perhaps best of all, the Geneva Accords left Vietnam divided and weak. The historical movement of the Vietnamese down the backbone of the peninsula had been checked. The task of Cambodia's foreign policy would be to maintain the status quo.

3. To Sihanouk and other Cambodians, the key factor in the modern history of the Indochina peninsula has been the unrelenting pressure exerted on Cambodia's territory from Thailand and Vietnam. Other factors, French colonialism and the struggle between the US and Communist China, have been important too. In the final analysis, however, these are overlays to the fundamental problem of Vietnamese and Thai imperialism.

4. In fighting for its territorial integrity, Cambodia has been handicapped by its relative weakness; it cannot match the power of Vietnam and Thailand. The Cambodians therefore have been forced to rely on diplomatic maneuver. In the nineteenth century, with its back to the wall, Cambodia called on France to protect it from its more powerful neighbors. The French protectorate, from the Cambodian perspective, was no euphemism. If France exacted a high price for its protection, if its control impinged heavily on Cambodia's sovereignty, that was unfortunate. It was more important that Cambodia be preserved.

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5. The situation changed in the 1950s. The postwar wave of nationalism that swept Indochina also claimed many young educated Cambodians, including Sihanouk. Cambodia could not continue as a French colony forever. More important, however, was the fact that the power realities in Indochina were changing. To the Cambodians, France was a spent force, and a new constellation would have to be brought into being if Cambodia's integrity was to be preserved.

6. Sihanouk is no ideologue, and when he espoused "neutralism" as the right path for Cambodia's foreign policy, it was from practical rather than theoretical considerations. "Neutralism" was a fashionable posture for the newly independent nations in the early fifties and Sihanouk undoubtedly thought it prudent to keep Cambodia in step. More importantly, "neutralism," in its emphasis on diplomatic rather than military solutions to problems and its emphasis on avoiding entanglement in the cold war, was consonant with Cambodia's traditional position and the realities in Indochina. Sihanouk put his own stamp on "neutralism," however. As he viewed it, neutrality enabled the small nation to exert a disproportionate amount of influence by playing off one great power against another.

7. Sihanouk played this game adroitly for ten years. He managed to keep his relations with the US in good repair, although he felt that the US was involved with Thai and South Vietnamese plotting against his government. At the same time, however, he was slowly improving relations with Communist China. This balance began to be disrupted in the early sixties by the growing strength of the Communists in South Vietnam.

8. As long as the Viet Cong posed no effective challenge to the government in Saigon, the insurgency was of only incidental interest to Cambodia. As early as 1958, however, the increased pace of guerrilla activity was beginning to have repercussions affecting relations between Saigon and Phnom Penh. In late June, on the eve of a Sihanouk fence-mending trip to Saigon, Vietnamese troops in pursuit of the Viet Cong attacked and briefly occupied a Cambodian

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village. The incident, the first in a long succession of similar incursions, touched off an exchange of charges and countercharges and Sihanouk's trip was canceled.

9. Although the activity of the Viet Cong was coming to play an increasingly important role in the stormy relations between Phnom Penh and Saigon, there is no indication that in the late fifties and very early sixties Sihanouk believed that a fundamental reassessment of his policy toward the Diem government was necessary. On the contrary, he admitted that the existence of an anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam worked to Cambodia's advantage. In an interview in the French newspaper Le Monde, Sihanouk volunteered that "in order to remain on good terms with my Communist friends, we prefer not to have a common border with them."

10. At some point, however, perhaps as early as 1961, Sihanouk became convinced that the Viet Cong were going to win in South Vietnam. He viewed with alarm what he regarded as US obtuseness to the real situation in South Vietnam and continuing US reliance on the Diem government, which he regarded as doomed to failure. His prescription was negotiation with the guerrillas while their strength was still limited. The object of the negotiations would be to "neutralize" South Vietnam, which in Sihanouk's terms meant to keep Vietnam divided. His persistent calls for a "Geneva" conference from 1962 to the present reflect this policy.

11. Cambodia's swing to the left, under way from at least 1961, became more pronounced in 1963. Phnom Penh's relations with the US deteriorated, principally because the US would not support negotiations with the Communists. At the same time Sihanouk was laying the groundwork for what he was coming increasingly to believe was a necessary accommodation with Hanoi and Peking. The problem for Sihanouk was shaping up as one of timing.


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12. In late 1964 Sihanouk for the first time began to talk of extending diplomatic recognition not only to North Vietnam but also to the Viet Cong. The deteriorating situation in South Vietnam, always in the forefront of Sihanouk's calculations, undoubtedly suggested a further swing to the left. Sihanouk almost certainly was also motivated by the frustrations attending his continuing failure to get what he had wanted most for two years, a new Geneva conference on Indochina that would somehow reintroduce diplomatic skills into a problem that was being increasingly dominated by the force of arms and men. For Sihanouk, a new Geneva conference held out the prospect of a "neutral solution" for South Vietnam. He still hoped, although he realized that continuing Viet Cong success made it increasingly less likely, that a neutral belt including South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand could be fashioned which would insulate the area from the East-West power struggle while keeping Vietnam divided.

13. Sihanouk has been willing to pay for Peking's support by taking the Chinese line on a whole series of international issues of peripheral interest to Cambodia. During talks in Peking late last year, however, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong learned firsthand what they probably had long suspected, that Sihanouk could be an extremely tough negotiator on matters directly affecting Cambodia's interests. When the Communists refused to knuckle under to some of Sihanouk's more extravagant demands, the talks broke down. To Sihanouk, the episode was but another example of Vietnamese perfidy, a fresh warning that the Vietnamese, whatever their political persuasion, were a threat to Cambodia. In a remarkable speech in Phnom Penh early this year, at a time when he was hosting the leftist Indochinese Peoples' Conference, Sihanouk warned the Cambodian military that "Vietnamese imperialism" of whatever political coloration was the real danger to Cambodia.

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14. In meeting this threat of a united Vietnam under Communist hegemony, Sihanouk has turned to Communist China in the hope--and he admits that it is little more--that Peking will use its influence to restrain the Vietnamese. As early as 1960, the Chinese reportedly promised "to use their influence" with Ho Chi Minh to persuade the Viet Cong to respect Cambodian neutrality, and to avoid incidents close to the Cambodian border. It is clear that Sihanouk puts little stock in such promises or Vietnamese assurances. He puts even less, however, in the ability of the US to hold the line in Southeast Asia.

15. As long as Sihanouk believes that the Viet Cong will win in South Vietnam, and that the US will be forced to negotiate its way out, we can expect Cambodia to hold to its present leftward course. By continuing to call Cambodia "neutral," however, Sihanouk indicates that he is not yet ready to burn all his bridges. He has already discovered that breaking relations with the US and curtailing his contacts with the West have severely reduced his room for diplomatic maneuver. There are strong indications that Sihanouk hopes to repair some of the damage by improving Cambodia's relations with Great Britain and Australia. A more fundamental change in Cambodia's course will depend to a great extent on the course of the war in South Vietnam.

Viet Cong Use of Cambodia

16. Although it is clear that the Viet Cong have used Cambodian territory since the early days of the insurgency in South Vietnam, the magnitude of that use and its relative importance to the guerrillas have never been clear. To a great extent the difficulty has been a natural result of the clandestine nature of the Communist effort and the inaccessibility of much of the terrain, compounded through the years by the currency given numerous reports of questionable origin and dubious value. At least part of the problem, especially in recent years, stems from a failure to distinguish as rigorously as possible the several ways in which

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the Communists use Cambodia and the limitations imposed on such use.

Supply

17. A substantial body of evidence has accumulated through the years on the use of Cambodia as a source of supply to the Viet Cong. The fragmentary nature of the evidence makes a meaningful estimate of the volume of this traffic almost impossible, but it seems clear that the total has been small in comparison with the guerrillas' requirements, and in comparison with what they have received through Laos, by sea infiltration, and from within South Vietnam. The evidence also suggests that most of the supplies procured from Cambodia consists of goods which can be purchased on the open market, principally foodstuffs, medicines, and clothing, or which can be imported into Cambodia through normal trade channels, principally certain strategic chemicals.

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Viet Cong prisoners have also provided detailed accounts of Viet Cong logistic operations in Cambodia, including the purchase of goods in public markets and the use of portage routes from Cambodia into South Vietnam.

18. There is some reason to believe that the Communists now calculate that this haphazard procurement of supplies from Cambodia is not enough. In a 1 November public "work session" in Phnom Penh, Sihanouk indicated that the Viet Cong had approached Cambodian economic chief Son Sann in an effort to buy Cambodian rice. Without indicating whether any decision had been made on this overture, Sihanouk said that the illicit traffic in rice from Cambodia to Vietnam--where the price of rice is much higher--was resulting in a considerable loss of revenue to the government. Acknowledging that both Cambodian civilian and military officials are implicated in this trade, Sihanouk asked that measures be implemented to prevent "rice from leaving our country."

the Viet Cong are negotiating for the purchase of some 5,000 tons of rice, although no agreement has been concluded as yet.

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19. Thus, numerous reports indicate that the Viet Cong have taken advantage of the long-standing illicit trade across the South Vietnamese - Cambodian border to secure nonmilitary supplies, but much less is known about the procurement of military hardware in or through Cambodia. There is some evidence, derived from interrogation reports, that the guerrillas have at various times stored weapons in Cambodian territory and have moved weapons along the Cambodian border. There is little firm evidence, however, that Cambodia has been an important source or channel for the movement of arms to the Viet Cong.

20. Reports concerning the possible shipment of arms to the Viet Cong through Cambodia have centered around Sihanoukville, Cambodia's only deep-water port with direct access to the open seas. Many of these reports have apparently been engendered by the deliveries, beginning in late 1964 and continuing into this year, of weapons supplied by Communist China to Cambodia. There has been no effort by Cambodia or Communist China to conceal these military deliveries. Access to the port by Western observers, including Australian and British military personnel, has been unrestricted. Largely for propaganda purposes, Sihanouk has made a point of announcing the shipments and providing a breakdown of the weapons supplied. Although it is impossible to trace the disposition of each Chinese rifle or machine gun, [redacted] this equipment is being used to rearm Cambodia's military and paramilitary forces.

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21. Sihanouk is particularly sensitive to allegations that the Viet Cong are receiving weapons via Cambodia. On one occasion, he personally disarmed an ethnic Chinese in the Cambodian militia because of possible "misunderstanding by certain countries." Recent press reports concerning the possible use of Sihanoukville by the Communists has prompted Sihanouk to ask the ICC to "control" the port. The ICC is currently in Sihanoukville inspecting manifests and making an assessment of personnel requirements for maintaining a permanent inspection team.

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22. No matter how thorough an inspection the ICC is able to make, there is really no way of guaranteeing that the Communists will not make use of Cambodia to get military hardware to the Viet Cong. (The potential capacity of Cambodian routes for this purpose, under both clandestine and open conditions, is examined at Annex.) Circumstantial evidence, including the fact that the Communists have devoted a considerable effort to improving and expanding their infiltration network in the Laotian panhandle, suggests, however, that they intend to rely on other routes, at least for the immediate future.

23. Several factors would militate against a significant expansion of Communist supply operations through Cambodia. The Communists would have to get Sihanouk's support to open Cambodia, and it is extremely doubtful that Sihanouk would invite retaliation by such blatant cooperation. Under present circumstances, it would be extremely difficult to use Sihanoukville or other potential supply routes in a major way without detection. The Communists would also be hesitant to establish a major supply route that would have to depend on Sihanouk, whom they undoubtedly consider on the basis of past performances to be thoroughly unreliable.

#### Sanctuary

24. Evidence that the Viet Cong have used Cambodian territory for sanctuary during engagements with South Vietnamese Government troops can be found as far back as the early beginnings of the insurgency movement. Even allowing for some exaggeration--in many instances the Viet Cong have been reported breaking contact and moving "toward" the Cambodian border--it is clear that the Viet Cong has been able to find safe haven in many areas along the Cambodian border. Various reports indicating that the guerrillas have built tunnels in the immediate border area suggest, however, that the Communists have sought wherever practicable to take advantage of the border without actually crossing into Cambodia. When they do cross, the Communists have been careful to avoid contact with Cambodian border outposts, taking advantage of a *laissez faire* policy adopted unilaterally by some Cambodian border forces.

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25. The extent of Viet Cong facilities on Cambodian territory is somewhat less clear, although again it is apparent that at various times and in various places along the 600-mile border such facilities have been established. The most reliable information on this subject comes from interrogation of Viet Cong prisoners. These reports indicate that small but useful encampments, storage facilities, and training areas have been established in Cambodian territory. In most cases the facilities are located just over the border.

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26. [redacted] is one of the most interesting of these reports because it concerns the extreme northeast area of Cambodia where Phnom Penh's control has always been weak, and because it conveys the flavor of how the Communists may be using Cambodian territory without the knowledge of Cambodian officials. [redacted]

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27. [redacted] infiltrated from southern Laos into Pleiku via a route through Cambodia closely paralleling the South Vietnamese border. [redacted] had stopped for rice or rest at six way stations inside Cambodian territory, although the coordinates given in the report locate the stations in South Vietnam. [redacted] to have seen several small groups of civilians carrying rice to two of the stations and that [redacted] contacted local civilians to barter food and cigarettes from them.

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28. Photographic evidence of Viet Cong activity in Cambodia has proved to be of only limited usefulness. One notable exception is a recent study showing a concentration of newly constructed huts in the extreme northeast salient of Cambodia. Improved trails link the area to the Laotian infiltration complex, strongly suggesting that the activity is not of Cambodian origin. The area concerned is one in which Cambodia has never exercised effective control, in which few Cambodians live, and which appears on Communist maps as part of Vietnam.

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
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
29. Other photography of the Cambodian border area has proved difficult to evaluate because it is almost impossible to distinguish between Communist activity and legitimate Cambodian activity. A recent preliminary photographic study of Cambodian territory bordering Pleiku Province, for example, indicates only that trails cross the border, that at some time in the past six years someone has built two improved trails leading from Route 19 toward the South Vietnamese border, and that there has been an increase in the number of Cambodian villages in the area. There is good reason to question whose activity the photography portrays. Phnom Penh has had a program to encourage settlement in the area--precisely because of an abiding fear that the area would come under Vietnamese control by default--and has made an attempt to improve its defensive posture along the entire length of the Vietnamese border, especially by building access roads to isolated outposts.

30. In sum, it seems clear that at various times the Communists have found it useful to establish clandestine, and probably temporary, facilities on Cambodian territory. From all indications these facilities have played only a small part in the over-all Communist effort in South Vietnam, and in no respects compare to the extensive guerrilla base areas located in South Vietnam itself.

Political

31. The political usefulness of Cambodia to the Communists is less tangible than its value as a source of supply and sanctuary, but it may be more important. As long as Sihanouk's "neutrality" is favorably disposed to the Communists and as long as he is willing to adopt the Communist line on a whole series of international issues of peripheral interest to Cambodia, then Peking and Hanoi derive considerable propaganda benefit from Phnom Penh. This situation is not without irony, for Sihanouk is only useful to the Communists to the extent that he is not a Communist and can continue to portray himself as a legitimate nationalist leader whose international posture is garbed in a somewhat

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soiled but still intact neutralism. It is for this reason that the Chinese probably are quite sincere when they tell Sihanouk that China wants Cambodia to remain "neutral."

32. The Viet Cong also derive certain political advantages from a "neutral" Cambodia which may be of greater importance than has been recognized heretofore. Not only do the Viet Cong receive comfort from Sihanouk's claims that they rather than the "lackeys" in Saigon represent the Vietnamese people, but the Viet Cong leadership undoubtedly finds it useful to have relatively safe and timely access to North Vietnam and China via Cambodia. In some ways Cambodia has been for years a political staging area for the Viet Cong, a doorway to the outside world through which friendly newspapermen can safely find their way to guerrilla camps in South Vietnam.

#### Complicity

33. Good information is available on the question of whether there is official Cambodian collusion with the Viet Cong in their use of Cambodian territory. From interrogation reports [redacted] it is apparent that in many areas along the border the Viet Cong have established a modus vivendi with Cambodian forces, in which the guerrillas are permitted to take refuge from South Vietnamese military forces. Prisoners have also reported that in some areas local Cambodian authorities have made no effort to interfere with Viet Cong procurement of supplies in Cambodia. If the Communists have little trouble with the Cambodians in some areas along the border, however, there are indications that the picture is quite different in other areas. Firefights between Cambodian border forces and the Viet Cong have been reliably reported this year. Cambodian forces have also launched clearing operations against suspected Viet Cong intruders. This conflicting picture of VC-Cambodian border relations suggests that there is no Phnom Penh - directed policy of open support to the Communist guerrillas. In recent months, moreover, Phnom Penh's sensitivity to Viet Cong clandestine operations has been demonstrated in statements made by Sihanouk urging the military to take measures to

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ensure that there is no illicit traffic in rice and weapons into South Vietnam.

34. The best circumstantial evidence that Phnom Penh is neither in league with the Viet Cong nor even believes that there are important guerrilla facilities on Cambodian territory is its apparent willingness to open Cambodian territory to outside inspection. Cambodia is on record in favor of an expanded ICC to inspect and control its territory, although the sincerity of this offer has not been put to the test. Sihanouk has, however, opened sensitive areas to inspection by Western officials, and at various times has invited US newspapermen to Cambodia to make first hand observations. Although the usefulness of these quick "inspections" is obviously limited, the freedom which US newspapermen testify they were accorded to visit any areas of their choosing appears to indicate that the Cambodians feel that they have nothing to hide.

35. The extent to which Phnom Penh, and especially Sihanouk, is aware of the collusion with the Viet Cong which does occur in certain areas along the border is not entirely clear. Sihanouk has been remarkable consistent through the years in denials that the Viet Cong use Cambodian territory. At the same time, he is fully aware of the pervasive corruption that characterizes Cambodian officialdom from top to bottom. Certainly he realizes that the Viet Cong can do many things in Cambodia merely by taking advantage of Cambodian cupidity. If Sihanouk is not fully aware of the situation along the border,

25X1 Cambodian Defense Minister Lon Nol is. Lon Nol is

25X1 chagrined that the Communists "in small numbers" took advantage of Cambodian territory during the battles near Plei Me. He indicated that there was little Cambodia's undermanned border forces could do.

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36. From Sihanouk's perspective, giving open materiel support to the Communist guerrillas would involve serious risks without commensurate gains. He has been willing to underscore Cambodia's "moral" support for the Communists by making a public gift of medical supplies--while at the same time turning

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down Communist requests for further such aid sub rosa--but, as he fully realizes, providing the Viet Cong with other kinds of assistance, especially military hardware, would be a different matter.  
(Map)

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**SECRET****ANNEX****COMMUNIST USE OF CAMBODIA IN SUPPORT  
OF THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

1. If the Cambodian Government were openly to permit the use of its territory to support Communist military activities in South Vietnam, the Viet Cong would gain overt access to about 600 miles of Cambodian - South Vietnamese border territory which they could use for sanctuary areas and for storage areas, rest camps, training facilities, hospitals, and workshops. They could, moreover, develop a major and secure supply system into the delta area of South Vietnam. This supply system would have the capacity to move the additional 1,200 tons\* of military supplies which we estimate could be handled daily by the port of Sihanoukville. This capability is more than seven times the maximum projection--165 tons--of the daily external logistic support requirement of greatly expanded VC/PAVN forces fighting at highly intensified levels of combat in South Vietnam. The capability of VC/PAVN forces to wage war in the central highlands of South Vietnam, however, would not be affected measurably by the use of Cambodian territory. The central highlands area is more easily and directly supplied through Laos.

2. Even without the cooperation of the Cambodian Government, the Communists could make greater use of Cambodian territory. They could expand the current type of small-scale infiltration by sending more people to purchase supplies in the open market and by making more use of the legitimate import houses and the Vietnamese Communist cell in Phnom Penh. Supplies obtained through these organizations have been moved across the border by smugglers and other clandestine means. There are also remote border areas of Cambodia which are not under effective control of the national government. These areas have, in fact, been used for military purposes.

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\* Tonnages are given in short tons.

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3. Since the capacity of the supply system through Laos is well in excess of current VC/PAVN requirements, the use of Cambodia as an infiltration route is more a matter of convenience than of necessity. We would estimate, however, that through a combined use of normal commercial channels and clandestine means the Communists could procure and move moderate amounts of supplies through Cambodia. They would certainly be able to do this to the extent necessary to supplement the existing logistical system through Laos. Although the recent USIB Memorandum, Infiltration and Logistics - South Vietnam, 28 October 1965, [redacted] was unable to quantify the volume of supplies moving through Cambodia, such volume was regarded as small, probably not exceeding one to two tons daily. The Communists almost certainly have the capability to increase this volume substantially. It is doubtful that the Communists, through clandestine means alone, could move, on a sustained basis, the 12 tons of military supplies needed daily by the VC/PAVN forces in South Vietnam. This doubt arises principally from the fact that illicit traffic of this volume could hardly clear the port of Sihanoukville without detection. If the 12 tons could be landed at Sihanoukville or other points along the coast, however, the Communists could undoubtedly move them forward into South Vietnam. At a minimum, the ability of the Communists to move goods clandestinely through Cambodia would be sufficient to provide an important adjunct to infiltration of supplies by sea.

4. If Cambodia were to give open cooperation, a comparatively large volume of supplies for the Viet Cong could enter the port of Sihanoukville. During 1964, this port handled about 800,000 tons of goods, of which 220,000 tons were imports. Under normal port operations, the port could handle additional imports of at least 450,000 tons per year, or an average of about 1,200 tons per day. Besides the major port of Sihanoukville, Cambodia has three minor ports which are used mostly for fishing and naval activities. A small additional amount of tonnage could be delivered at these ports, but only one of them can accommodate small oceangoing ships. For the most part, offloading at these ports would take place in the roadstead through the use of lighters. Clearance from Sihanoukville and the minor ports would be mainly by road transport, although coastal water transport using small

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craft would also be available. Cambodia is estimated to have about 10,000 trucks, and more could easily be imported. A railroad from Sihanoukville to Phnom Penh has been under construction for about five years, but a number of major bridges and most of the track-laying on the 160-mile route remain to be completed.

5. The roads leading out of Sihanoukville have a greater capacity than the port itself and could easily handle 1,200 tons of military supplies for shipment to South Vietnam. The major route which would be used to clear the port is Route 4, the 145-mile Sihanoukville - Phnom Penh American Friendship Highway. This route has a capacity of 8,150 tons per day in the dry season and 7,350 tons per day in the rainy season. From Phnom Penh the best route to the border is Route 1, which extends east to the southeastern border of Tay Ninh Province. It has a capacity of 4,200 tons per day in the dry season and 1,800 tons per day in the rainy season. The movement of 1,200 tons daily from Sihanoukville to the border on this route would require from 1,500 to 2,000 trucks.\* There are also two routes that extend north from the Phnom Penh area and connect with Route 7, which approaches the northern border of Tay Ninh Province. These routes have lower capacities than Route 1, especially in the rainy season, and the distance to the border is greater. From Phnom Penh, there are two other slightly shorter routes that extend to the border of Kien Giang and Chau Doc provinces. At least 1,200 tons per day could be moved over these two routes throughout the year.

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\* Assuming that each truck carries 3.5 tons.

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# CAMBODIA




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28 December 1965

No. 3183/65

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## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

CAMBODIA AND THE VIET CONG

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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GROUP 1
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